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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
LABOR RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
'HE right of employees in private industry to organize into
labor unions and to engage in concerted action to enforce their
demands is well recognized. The right is less well recognized in
the domain of government employment. In many respects the
relationship existing between the government (federal, state or
municipal) and its employees is radically different from that
existing between private employers and employees. The differ-
ence has been recognized repeatedly in labor legislation.'
A number of reasons combine to place the government worker
in a special category. It is commonly thought that he is not in
need of the protection which is necessary in private employment!
Representative government is expected to deal fairly with its
employees and to be an example to the community in establish-
ing wages, hours and working conditions. The benefits of civil
service, of tenure, and of increases in pay at regular intervals
are often afforded while private industry lags in these respects.
The government does not have the profit-making motive of the
private employer, nor does it have to meet competition in hold-
ing labor costs to a minimum. The government is not under the
economic compulsion of driving a hard bargain with its em-
ployees. Accordingly, the necessity for organization and con-
certed activity by government employees is reduced.
, The Wagner Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and the recent Labor Man.
agement Relations Act of 1947 exempt government workers from their provisions by
expressly excluding the United States, the states, and the political subdivisions thereof
from the definition of the term "employer."
2 "It is realized that the federal civil service system is an elaborate, carefully con-
structed system of personnel and labor relations which has accorded to government
employees many benefits which organized labor has yet been unable to secure from pri-
vate industry through strikes and organizational activities over a period of many years.
It has, indeed, long been the practice of many union representatives in private industry
to base their arguments for requested employment benefits upon comparable benefits
secured by government employees...." TELLER, LABOR DtsPUrS AND COLLFCTrVE BAR-
GAINING, 105 (1946 Supplement).
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Other factors have affected public opinion concerning organ-
ization of government employees. The government worker has
been regarded as a docile person who has preferred the security
of his job to the larger opportunities and risks of the world of
private enterprise. Many people associate government employ-
ment with the spoils system, and the employee is looked upon as
the recipient of a political plum.3 Finally, organizational activity
among public employees has suggested the possibility of strikes
against government and impairment of its sovereignty. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who certainly was a friend of labor, was
influenced by this consideration.'
During the past few years there has been large scale expansion
of government-in many instances into fields once deemed exclu-
sively private. Since the government (federal, state and mu-
nicipal) is the largest employer in the country, it seems desirable
to examine into the legal aspects of its relations with labor organ-
izations.
Do GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES HAVE THE RIGHT TO JOIN UNIONS?
The Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912' was the first law dealing
3 "The general public is inclined to view the civil servant as a surly, uncooperative
individual, who has procured a soft job through political pull and has never done an
honest day's work in his life. He is regarded as a person with no real ambition or ability,
for otherwise he would be 'out in the world' doing something worth while and getting
somewhere instead of putting his nose into other people's business. This popular atti-
tude may be explained in part by the long association of government service with the
spoils system.... And while today some 60 percent of the federal employees are shel-
tered under the civil service, a government job is still considered, in the public mind,
to be a political plum." Agger, The Government and Its Employees, 47 YALE L. J. 1109,
1110 (1938).
4 Id. at 1103; Comment, Government Employees and Unionism, 54 HAMV. L. REV.
1360, 1365 (1941). In a letter to Mr. Luther C. Steward, President of the National Feder-
ation of Federal Labor, he said in part: "Particularly, I want to emphasize my convic-
tion that militant tactics have no place in the functions of an organization of government
employees. Upon employees in the federal service rests the obligation to serve the whole
people, whose interests and welfare require orderliness and continuity in the conduct
of Government activities. This obligation is paramount. Since their own services have to
do with the functioning of the Government, a strike of public employees manifests noth-
ing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government
until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of Govern-
ment by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable." RH"yE,
LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL LAw, 436 (1946).
5 37 SrAr. 555 (1912) 5 U. S. C. A. § 652 (1934).
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with the right of federal employees to organize. It provided that
membership in a union should not be cause for demotion, suspen-
sion or dismissal. The Act specifically referred to postal employees,
but it was generally assumed that its policies protected all govern-
ment employees.6 Nevertheless, there was and is a body of opinion
that it is undesirable for such employees to organize. This feel-
ing is exemplified in Railway Mail Association v. Murphy, a
New York Supreme Court decision, which declared that any com-
bination of civil service employees of the federal government was
incompatible with the spirit of democracy and that collective bar-
gaining had no place in government service.
The Murphy case was a suit by the Railway Mail Association
for a declaratory judgment that it was not a labor organization
within the meaning of a New York statute forbidding discrimina-
tion in denying membership because of race, color or creed. The
Association had a membership of 22,000 postal clerks of the
United States Railway Mail Service. The trial court held that it
was an insurance society and was not, and could not lawfully be.
a labor organization.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision below
and held that the Association was within the terms of the statute
prohibiting discrimination." On further appeal the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below.' Both appellate de-
cisions recognized the right of government employees to organize
6 Agger, supra, note 3, at 1128.
7 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 601,607 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1945), the court said: "To tolerate or rec-
ognize any combination of Civil Service employees of the Government as a labor organ-
ization or union is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, but inconsistent
with every principle upon whch our Government is founded. Nothing is more dangerous
to public welfare than to admit that hired servants of the state can dictate to the Gov-
ernment the hours, the wages and conditions under which they will carry cn the essen-
tial services vital to the welfare, safety and security of the citizen. To admit as true that
Government employees have power to halt or check the functions of Government, unless
their demands are satisfied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive and judicial
power. Nothing would be more ridiculous."
S Sub nomine, Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 267 App. Div. 417, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 404
(1944) , 293 N. Y. 315; 56 N. E. (2d) 721 (1944).
9 326 U. S. 88 (1944).
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into unions. The Supreme Court regarded the Lloyd.LaFollette
Act as a Congressional expression permitting government work-
ers to associate in unions.
Generally, it can be said that public employees have the right
to form organizations for their mutual benefit and to affiliate with
labor unions.0 However, this right has been prohibited or quali.
fled in three well-defined types of municipal employment.
1. Police officers have been denied the right to join a union
by ordinance or regulation on the ground that they must be free
from any obligations to a union in order properly to perform
their duties. In any controversy between employer and employees
the police officer should enter into the discharge of his duties
without partiality." Furthermore, because of the close relation
between the police force and city government, there exists the
same necessity of discipline and regulation as in a military force. 2
2. Fireman have been denied the right to join a union because
a labor organization might seek to control the relations of the
firemen with the municipality in a manner inconsistent with nec-
essary discipline. Thus, an organization might be detrimental to
the general welfare and safety."
10 City of Springfield v. Clause, 206 S. W. (2d) 539 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1947).
11 For an extensive review of older authorities see Fraternal Order of Police v. Harris.
306 Mich. 68, 10 N. W. (2d) 310 (1943), in which the validity of a regulation prohibit-
ing certain members of the police force from joining a union was sustained. The United
States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari. 321 U. S. 784 (1944).
Accord: City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 505, 24 So. (2d) 319 (1946), cert. denied,
328 U. S. 863 (1946) ; King v. Priest, 206 S. W. (2d) 547 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1947).
12 The peculiar status of police officers is explained in Coane v. Geary. 298 I1. App.
199,18 N. E. (2d) 719, 722 (19391 : "A police force is peculiar. sui generis, you may say.
in its formation and in its relation to the city government. It is practically an organized
force resembling in many respects a military force. organized under tle laws of the
United States and equally as important as to the functions it is required to perform....
And there is the same necessity of discipline, of regulation existing in the police depart-
ment that exists in regard to the military department. Strict discipline must be enforced,
and it must be enforced in a manner that is effective and without the supervision or reg-
ulation of any other department of the state, and, particularly without any attempt on the
part of the judicial department (which is a branch of the government entirely distinct
and separate from the executive department), to regulate it in any way, and particu-
larly, to regulate its discipline."
1 In Carter v. Thompson. 164 Va. 312, 180 S. E. 410 (1935), the court held that a
rule of a city manager forbidding firemen to join an A. F. of L. union was within his
discretion. The court said at 412: "Police and fire departments are in a class apart. Both
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3. School teachers have been denied the right to join a union
because of a belief that free and impartial thinking might be
abridged by membership in an organization which dictates pol-
icies to its members. Since a board of education is responsible
for its action only to the people of the municipality, many deci-
sions hold that school authorities may require non-membership in
a union as a condition of employment."
Other cases have been decided upholding ordinances prohibit-
are at times charged with the preservation of public order, and for manifold reasons they
owe to the public their undivided allegiance. The power in the city of complete control
is imperatively necessary if discipline is to be maintained."
In McNatt v. Lawler, 223 S. W. 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), certain firemen of the
City of Dallas became members of a local union affiliated with the A. F. of L. Upon their
refusal to withdraw from the union, they were held properly discharged under a charter
provision providing that the Board of Commissioners could determine the sufficiency of
the cause of removal. In San Antonio Fire Fighters Local Union No. 84 v. Bell, 223 S. W.
506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), a suit was dismissed in which the union requested the court
to restrain the city from discharging employees who were union members. Hutchinson v.
Magee, 278 Pa. 119, 122 A. 234 (1923), is a case upholding a rule issued by the Director
of Public Safety of Philadelphia that all officers of the fire department refrain from
belonging to an association which two years before had organized a strike. The court
stated: "It is generally conceded that association with an organization which... attempts
to control the relations of members of either the police or fire departments toward the
municipality they undertake to serve, is... inconsistent with the discipline which such
employment imperatively requires, and therefore must prove subversive of the public
service and detrimental to the general welfare; ... the order herein requested was
within the 'discretion of the director,' and that discretion, being 'based upon a reason-
able and legal grounds,' is final. If plaintiffs desire to retain their positions in the public
service, they should have obeyed the director's order: having elected not to do so... they
cannot successfully complain of the ensuing results."
14 In Fursman v. Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N. E. 158 (1917) the court held that a
school board had the right to pass and enforce a resolution making participation in a
plan to affiliate with union labor equivalent to resignation. In so ruling the court said at
160: "No person has a right to demand that he or she be employed as a teacher. The
board has the absolute right to decline to employ or re-employ any applicant for any
reason whatever or for no reason at all. The board is responsible for its action only to
the people of the city, from whom, through the mayor, the members have received their
appointments. It is no infringement upon the constitutional rights of anyone for the
board to decline to employ him as a teacher in the schools, and it is immaterial whether
the reason for the refusal to employ him is because the applicant is married or unmar-
ried, is of fair complexion or dark. is or is not a member of a trades union, or whether
no reason is given for such refusal. The board is not bound to give any reason for its
action. It is free to contract with whomsoever it chooses. Neither the Constitution nor
the statute places any restriction upon this right of the board to contract, and no one
has any grievance which the court will recognize simply because the board of education
refuses to con'tract with him or her. Questions or policy are solely for determination of
the board, and when they have once been determined by it the courts will not inquire
into their propriety." Accord: Frederick v. Owens, 35 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 538 (1915), peti-
tion in error dismissed in 95 Ohio St. 407, 116 N. E. 1085 (1916) ; Seattle Chapter of the
A. F. of L. v. Sharpless, 159 Wash. 424, 293 P. 994 (1930).
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ing various classes of city employees from organizing or joining
unions. In Congress of Industrial Organizations v. City of Dallas5
plaintiff union sued to enjoin defendant city from dismissing cer-
tain city employees who had organized and joined a local union.
An ordinance made it a punishable offense for any city employee
"to organize a labor union, organization, or Club of City em-
ployees, or to be or become a member thereof . . . " It further
provided that any employee who violated the ordinance would be
subject to discharge. The district court refused a temporary in-
junction, and the union appealed on the grounds that the ordinance
deprived city employees of the right of petition and assembly and
of freedom of speech and press and denied them equal protection
of the laws; and that the ordinance was in conflict with the laws
of Texas which make it lawful for all employees to organize and
become members of labor unions of their own choosing.
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the district court and de-
clared that the city employees, by accepting employment with the
City of Dallas, impliedly agreed to all existing conditions, one
of which was not to organize or affiliate with a labor union. The
court stated that even though city employees have a right to insist
upon their constitutional rights, they do not have a constitutional
right to remain in the service of the City. To the contention that
the ordinance was in conflict with Articles 5152 and 5154A" of
the Texas Civil Statutes the court ruled that they had no applica-
tion to public employees.
Subsequent to this case the Fiftieth Texas Legislature enacted
a statute declaring it to be against the public policy of the state
to deny any person public employment because of membership
or non-membership in a labor organization." In the face of this
15 198 S. W. (2d) 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). Accord: Miami Local No. 654 v. City
of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. (2d) 194 (Fla. 1946) ; City of Springfield v. Clause, 206
S. W. (2d) 539 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1947).
16 Art. 5152 declares the right of employees to organize into unions. Art. 5154a is the
Manford Act, which regulates union activity in Texas. Trx. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1947).
17 "It is declared to be the public policy of the State of Texas that no person shall be
1948]
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legislation, the City of Dallas case, sustaining an ordinance for-
bidding municipal employees to join unions, is probably no longer
good law today. The language of the statute seems to guarantee
the right of organization to all public employees."5 Possibly school
teachers, firemen, and police officers will continue as exceptions
to the general rule recognizing the right of public workers to
organize.
II. Do GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES HAVE THE RIGHT TO STRIKE?
The Taft-Hartley Act expressly prohibits strikes by govern-
ment employees, provides for the immediate discharge of striking
employees, and makes them ineligible for reemployment for three
years.1" Similarly, Texas statutes declare the public policy to be
against strikes by public employees and provide for forfeiture by
a striking employee of all civil service rights, reemployment rights
and other rights, benefits or privileges which he enjoys as a re-
sult of his employment. "
Prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, there was no fed-
eral statute forbidding a strike by government workers.21 But
statutes existed which could be used against certain kinds of gov-
ernment strikes. For example, a federal criminal statute forbid-
ding interference with the mails was used successfully against
postal employees who resigned in protest against intolerable
conditions.22
It has generally been thought that striking against the govern-
ment is illegal because the terms and conditions of public em-
denied public employment by reason of membership or nonmembership in a labor organ-
ization." TEx. REv. CrV. STAT. (Vernon 1925) Art. 5154c, § 4 (1947).
Is Surveys by the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in 1941 and in 1946,
contained in RHYNE'S LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAW (1946), disclosed
that public employees in many municipalities have become members of labor unions and
that most state attorney generals and city attorneys have ruled such membership to be
lawful, with certain exceptions. The exceptions were policemen, firemen, and school
teachers.
19 Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 160 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 188 (1947).
20 Tx REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 5154c, § 3 (1947).
21 Agger, supra note 3, at 1131.
22 United States v. Deb, 64 Fed. 24 (C. C. N. D. 111. 1894).
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ployment are fixed by law and not by contract; and because the
public welfare and vital public services would be adversely af-
fested."' Actually, the danger of strikes by government employees
has been slight because the three unions which have represented
them have provisions in their charters renouncing the right to
strike." The few contracts entered into between cities and unions
usually contain provisions recognizing the strike weapon to be
inappropriate for use by municipal employees. Consequently few
strikes by public workers have occurred, and few cases have
squarely passed upon the right of such employees to strike.:
A question closely related to government strikes is whether
public employees have the right to picket. In Petrucci v. Hogan"
a transport workers' union picketed the homes of workers em-
ployed by a transit system owned and operated by a city in order
to persuade them to reaffiliate with the union. Injunction was
granted against the picketing, but mainly on the ground of unlaw-
fulness of the purpose (the establishment of a closed shop). It
would seem that if strikes by government employees are illegal,
picketing would be equally so. However, the constitutional right
of free speech complicates the question.
CAN GOVERNMENT ENTER. INTO A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
CONTRACT WITH A UNION?
A collective bargaining agreement is the usual outcome of
negotiations between an employer and a union representing his
employees. The agreement is a recognition of the union as bar-
gaining agent of the employees and is an enforceable contract
dealing with wages, hours, and conditions of employment.
A union representing the majority of employees has no enforce-
able right to collective bargaining at common law. The right is
enforceable only where labor relations laws prevail. The Labor
23 TELLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 101.
24 Agger, supra note 3, at 1131.
25 RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 44.
26 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 718 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).
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Management Relations Act of 1947 excludes from its benefits
government employees, both state and federal.27 The same is gen-
erally true of the state labor relations acts. Hence it is clear that
federal, state and municipal governments are under no duty to
bargain collectively with their union employees.
Even if the government were of a mind to bargain collectively,
it is doubtful that it could enter into an enforceable collective
contract. Unless the authority to do so is given in express terms
it is very questionable that a public official or agency would have
power to contract:" No contract could be made insonsistent with
the statute creating the employment. And the government as sov-
ereign could not be sued without enabling legislation. The most
a union could hope to do would be to present grievances to the
legislature and to cause public officials to act favorably within
the confines of their authority.
In this connection it is appropriate to note the remarks of
Franklin D. Roosevelt on this subject:
"All government employees should realize that the process of collec-
tive bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into pub-
lic service. It has distinct and insurmountable limitations when applied
to public personnel management. The very nature and the purposes of
Government makes it impossible for administrative officials to represent
fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with government
employee organizations. The employer is the whole people, who speak
by means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accord-
ingly, administrative officials and employees alike are governed and
guided, and in many instances restricted, by laws which establish poli-
cies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters." 2
Recent legislation in Texas has declared it unlawful for public
officials to enter into collective bargaining contracts with labor
organizations respecting wages, hours or conditions of employ-
ment." Further, public officials are prohibited from recognizing
27 Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (2) (1947).
28 Tn.uEt, op. cit. supra note 2, at 101.
2 RHNk, op. cit. supra note 4, at 436.
SOTrLx REv. CirV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 5154c, § 1 (1947).
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a labor organization as a bargaining agent for public employees.
The trend of American decisions has been to declare void any
contract between a municipality and a labor union covering terms
and conditions of employment as an unlawful delegation of power
to the union." Typical of the cases dealing with the question are
the Mugord cases. 2 In the first of these cases a taxpayer brought
suit to enjoin the enforcement of a contract between the Depart-
ment of Public Works of Baltimore and the Municipal Chauffeurs,
Helpers and Garage Employees Union, Local 825, an affiliate of
the A. F. of L. The contract, which recognized the union as the
"sole and exclusive bargaining representative for all employees
of the department," was condemned by the Maryland Circuit
court because it granted an unlawful preference to the union over
individuals who might not be members of the union. The court
noted that the litigants were in agreement that the city had no
authority to consent to a closed" shop agreement.
A second contract was entered into providing that any individ-
ual might bargain in his own behalf but that the department
would not recognize or deal with any union or organization other
than Local 825. Again suit was brought to enjoin performance of
the contract. and the circuit court held that it constituted an un-
lawful preference of one group over another. The court went on
to rule that the contract provision for deduction of union dues
by the city at the request of the employee, revocable by him at
any time, was valid. However, the court found that the valid and
invalid provisions were inseparable and declared the whole con-
tract void.
The theory of American government is that it is organized and
administered for the welfare of the whole people and not for the
benefit of any one group or class. Hence a contract providing
-1 City of Springfield v. Clause, 206 S. W. (2d) 539 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1947).
32 The Mugford cases were a series of three decisions by Circuit Court No. 2 of Balti-
more City: Opinion of April 14, 1944, 8 C. C. H. LAB. CAS. T 62,137; Opinion of July 5,
1944, reprinted in RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EmPLOYEE LAw, 164 (1946);
and Opinion of November 16, 1944. These decisions were followed by a partial review
in the Maryland Court of Appeals, 185 Md. 266,44 A. (2d) 745 (1945).
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for a closed shop or for the maintenance of union membership
as a condition of employment or for the recognition of a union
as the exclusive bargaining agent, entered into with a govern-
mental agency, violates what many persons regard as a first prin-
ciple of sound government.33
Occasionally a court sustains the validity of a collective bar-
gaining contract betwen a public agency and a union of public
employees on the ground that the municipality is acting in a pro-
prietary capacity and not as a political agency exercising gov-
ernmental powers."' In Nutter v. Santa Monica"5 it was held by
the trial court that the City of Santa Monica was operating a bus
line in a proprietary capacity and therefore could not resist a
request on the part of the employees to bargain collectively. The
judgment was reversed on appeal on the ground that labor laws
applicable to private industry could not be construed to apply to
public employment.
CAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES COLLECT UNION DuEs
BY CHECK-OFF?
Another of the implements of effective union organization is
the check-off, which is the deduction by the employer from an
employee's wages at prescribed intervals of the amounts due to
the union for initiation fees, dues, fines and assessments. The
compulsory check-off system was considered in the Mugford
cases and at first was held to be illegal as a device for the accom-
plishment of a closed shop.
The second contract entered into put deduction of dues on a
voluntary basis, revocable by the employee at any time. Any ex-
pense incurred by the City in collecting the dues and assessments
was to be paid by the union. The circuit court found that this
8 Chaplin v. Board of Education of Peoria (fll. Cir. Ct. 1939), text reprinted in
Appendix of RYNE, LABOR UNTONs AND MUNICrPAL LAW, 157 (1946).
5, This distinction is often applied in determining questions of municipal liability
for tort or for taxes.3 8 C. C. H. LAs. CAs. I 62,323 (Calif. Superior Ct. 1944); 74 Cal. App. (2d)
29, 168 P. (2d) 741 (Calif. Dist. Ct. of App. 1946).
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arrangement constituted the City the agent of the employee for
the purpose of paying his union dues and that the arrangement
was valid as long as the employee permitted his written order to
remain in effect. The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed with
the trial court on this point and ruled that the City could extend
to individuals the privilege of having dues deducted and paid to
the union if they so requested.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to state unequivocal rules prevailing in labor rela-
tions between government and its employees. The reason is that
disputes between the government and its employees have been
comparatively few and have very infrequently ended up in the
courts. Certainly it can be said that government employees are
more circumscribed in their joint activities than are private em-
ployees. This is largely because government workers are con-
sidered to be less in need of the protection afforded by aggressive,
concerted action and because their uninterrupted services are
important to the community.
In general, government employees may organize and join
unions. Their representatives may counsel with the legislature
and with high-ranking officials who do the hiring. There is consid-
erable doubt that collective bargaining contracts can be entered
into or enforced, in the absence of specific legislative authoriza.
tion. Contracts for exclusive bargaining privileges or for closed
shop are probably invalid. The right to strike and to picket gov-
ernmental agencies has had little or no recognition.
One hesitates to predict that the union movement among gov-
ernment employees will go much further than recognition of the
right to organize and join employee associations. So long as the
government is a "model" employer there will be little occasion
for the agitation and disruption found in some areas of private
industry.
lohn Fox Holt.
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